diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 790 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 790 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c deleted file mode 100644 index 78260664..00000000 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,790 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#include "internal/cryptlib.h" -#include "internal/bn_int.h" -#include "rsa_locl.h" - -#ifndef RSA_NULL - -static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, - BN_CTX *ctx); -static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa); -static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa); -static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = { - "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA (from Eric Young)", - rsa_ossl_public_encrypt, - rsa_ossl_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ - rsa_ossl_private_encrypt, /* signing */ - rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, - rsa_ossl_mod_exp, - BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery - * if e == 3 */ - rsa_ossl_init, - rsa_ossl_finish, - RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */ - NULL, - 0, /* rsa_sign */ - 0, /* rsa_verify */ - NULL /* rsa_keygen */ -}; - -const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void) -{ - return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth; -} - -static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) - goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - - /* - * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the - * modulus - */ - j = BN_num_bytes(ret); - i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); - for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) - to[k] = 0; - - r = num; - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BN_BLINDING *ret; - - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa->lock); - - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { - rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - - ret = rsa->blinding; - if (ret == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(ret)) { - /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ - - *local = 1; - } else { - /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ - - /* - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the - * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and - * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING - */ - *local = 0; - - if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { - rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - } - ret = rsa->mt_blinding; - } - - err: - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa->lock); - return ret; -} - -static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, - BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (unblind == NULL) - /* - * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING. - */ - return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else { - /* - * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING. - */ - int ret; - - BN_BLINDING_lock(b); - ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); - BN_BLINDING_unlock(b); - - return ret; - } -} - -static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, - BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - /* - * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex - * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING - * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: - * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and - * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe - * to access the blinding without a lock. - */ - return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); -} - -/* signing */ -static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; - int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - /* - * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store - * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. - */ - BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (i <= 0) - goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) { - if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); - if (d == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) { - BN_free(d); - goto err; - } - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) { - BN_free(d); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ - BN_free(d); - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { - BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); - if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) - res = f; - else - res = ret; - } else - res = ret; - - /* - * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the - * modulus - */ - j = BN_num_bytes(res); - i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); - for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) - to[k] = 0; - - r = num; - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int j, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; - /* - * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store - * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. - */ - BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; - BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the - * top '0' bytes - */ - if (flen > num) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - /* make data into a big number */ - if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); - if (blinding == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (blinding != NULL) { - if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* do the decrypt */ - if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || - ((rsa->p != NULL) && - (rsa->q != NULL) && - (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { - if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) - goto err; - } else { - BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); - if (d == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) { - BN_free(d); - goto err; - } - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) { - BN_free(d); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ - BN_free(d); - } - - if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - - p = buf; - j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); - break; - case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -/* signature verification */ -static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) -{ - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int i, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { - if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - return -1; - } - } - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); - if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the - * top '0' bytes - */ - if (flen > num) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); - goto err; - } - - if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) - goto err; - - if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, - RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); - goto err; - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - - if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12)) - if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) - goto err; - - p = buf; - i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); - break; - case RSA_X931_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); - break; - case RSA_NO_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); - break; - default: - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); - goto err; - } - if (r < 0) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); - - err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); - return (r); -} - -static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; - int ret = 0; - - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - - r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - - { - BIGNUM *p = BN_new(), *q = BN_new(); - - /* - * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the - * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag - */ - if (p == NULL || q == NULL) { - BN_free(p); - BN_free(q); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_p, rsa->lock, p, ctx) - || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, - rsa->lock, q, ctx)) { - BN_free(p); - BN_free(q); - goto err; - } - } - /* - * We MUST free p and q before any further use of rsa->p and rsa->q - */ - BN_free(p); - BN_free(q); - } - - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked - (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - - /* compute I mod q */ - { - BIGNUM *c = BN_new(); - if (c == NULL) - goto err; - BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) { - BN_free(c); - goto err; - } - - { - BIGNUM *dmq1 = BN_new(); - if (dmq1 == NULL) { - BN_free(c); - goto err; - } - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_q)) { - BN_free(c); - BN_free(dmq1); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */ - BN_free(dmq1); - } - - /* compute I mod p */ - if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) { - BN_free(c); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free c before any further use of I */ - BN_free(c); - } - - { - BIGNUM *dmp1 = BN_new(); - if (dmp1 == NULL) - goto err; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_p)) { - BN_free(dmp1); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */ - BN_free(dmp1); - } - - if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) - goto err; - /* - * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the - * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) - goto err; - - { - BIGNUM *pr1 = BN_new(); - if (pr1 == NULL) - goto err; - BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) { - BN_free(pr1); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free pr1 before any further use of r1 */ - BN_free(pr1); - } - - /* - * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' - * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can - * break the private key operations: the following second correction - * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen - * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] - */ - if (BN_is_negative(r0)) - if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) - goto err; - - if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) - goto err; - /* - * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will - * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the - * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for - * absolute equality, just congruency. - */ - if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) - goto err; - if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) - goto err; - if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) - if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) - goto err; - if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { - /* - * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak - * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and - * return that instead. - */ - - BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); - if (d == NULL) - goto err; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - - if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, - rsa->_method_mod_n)) { - BN_free(d); - goto err; - } - /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ - BN_free(d); - } - } - ret = 1; - err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - return (ret); -} - -static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa) -{ - rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; - return (1); -} - -static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa) -{ - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); - BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); - return (1); -} - -#endif |