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authorAdam Ierymenko <adam.ierymenko@gmail.com>2015-11-23 10:46:52 -0800
committerAdam Ierymenko <adam.ierymenko@gmail.com>2015-11-23 10:46:52 -0800
commita18336fa1899a9f53b161a60e766695007c49a7b (patch)
treef464c0475ea49e3714df86d69508644adcf2e98a /node/Packet.hpp
parent1e4a40e77205b028d799f7112127f3f2f107117e (diff)
parent764dd1c3d94527c0870a913ac314b3b17eaea282 (diff)
downloadinfinitytier-a18336fa1899a9f53b161a60e766695007c49a7b.tar.gz
infinitytier-a18336fa1899a9f53b161a60e766695007c49a7b.zip
MERGE current "dev" into "netcon" -- should not affect netcon itself but will retest -- brings ZeroTier core up to 1.1.0
Diffstat (limited to 'node/Packet.hpp')
-rw-r--r--node/Packet.hpp207
1 files changed, 143 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/node/Packet.hpp b/node/Packet.hpp
index 409762c7..ef0251e3 100644
--- a/node/Packet.hpp
+++ b/node/Packet.hpp
@@ -46,22 +46,24 @@
#include "../ext/lz4/lz4.h"
/**
- * Protocol version -- incremented only for MAJOR changes
+ * Protocol version -- incremented only for major changes
*
* 1 - 0.2.0 ... 0.2.5
* 2 - 0.3.0 ... 0.4.5
- * * Added signature and originating peer to multicast frame
- * * Double size of multicast frame bloom filter
+ * + Added signature and originating peer to multicast frame
+ * + Double size of multicast frame bloom filter
* 3 - 0.5.0 ... 0.6.0
- * * Yet another multicast redesign
- * * New crypto completely changes key agreement cipher
- * 4 - 0.6.0 ... CURRENT
- * * New identity format based on hashcash design
- *
- * This isn't going to change again for a long time unless your
- * author wakes up again at 4am with another great idea. :P
+ * + Yet another multicast redesign
+ * + New crypto completely changes key agreement cipher
+ * 4 - 0.6.0 ... 1.0.6
+ * + New identity format based on hashcash design
+ * 5 - 1.1.0 ... CURRENT
+ * + Supports circuit test, proof of work, and echo
+ * + Supports in-band world (root server definition) updates
+ * + Clustering! (Though this will work with protocol v4 clients.)
+ * + Otherwise backward compatible with protocol v4
*/
-#define ZT_PROTO_VERSION 4
+#define ZT_PROTO_VERSION 5
/**
* Minimum supported protocol version
@@ -233,15 +235,6 @@
*/
#define ZT_PROTO_MIN_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD
-// Destination address types from HELLO, OK(HELLO), and other message types
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_NONE 0
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_ZEROTIER 1 // reserved but unused
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_ETHERNET 2 // future use
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_BLUETOOTH 3 // future use
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_IPV4 4
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_LTE_DIRECT 5 // future use
-#define ZT_PROTO_DEST_ADDRESS_TYPE_IPV6 6
-
// Ephemeral key record flags
#define ZT_PROTO_EPHEMERAL_KEY_FLAG_FIPS 0x01 // future use
@@ -329,8 +322,6 @@
#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_WHOIS__OK__IDX_IDENTITY (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD)
-#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_WHOIS__ERROR__IDX_ZTADDRESS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD)
-
#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD)
#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT_LEN (ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8)
#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT (ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT_LEN + 2)
@@ -354,11 +345,11 @@ namespace ZeroTier {
* ZeroTier packet
*
* Packet format:
- * <[8] random initialization vector (doubles as 64-bit packet ID)>
+ * <[8] 64-bit random packet ID and crypto initialization vector>
* <[5] destination ZT address>
* <[5] source ZT address>
* <[1] flags/cipher (top 5 bits) and ZT hop count (last 3 bits)>
- * <[8] 8-bit MAC (currently first 8 bytes of poly1305 tag)>
+ * <[8] 64-bit MAC>
* [... -- begin encryption envelope -- ...]
* <[1] encrypted flags (top 3 bits) and verb (last 5 bits)>
* [... verb-specific payload ...]
@@ -374,6 +365,10 @@ namespace ZeroTier {
* immutable. This is because intermediate nodes can increment the hop
* count up to 7 (protocol max).
*
+ * A hop count of 7 also indicates that receiving peers should not attempt
+ * to learn direct paths from this packet. (Right now direct paths are only
+ * learned from direct packets anyway.)
+ *
* http://tonyarcieri.com/all-the-crypto-code-youve-ever-written-is-probably-broken
*
* For unencrypted packets, MAC is computed on plaintext. Only HELLO is ever
@@ -530,10 +525,13 @@ public:
*/
enum Verb /* Max value: 32 (5 bits) */
{
- /* No operation, payload ignored, no reply */
+ /**
+ * No operation (ignored, no reply)
+ */
VERB_NOP = 0,
- /* Announcement of a node's existence:
+ /**
+ * Announcement of a node's existence:
* <[1] protocol version>
* <[1] software major version>
* <[1] software minor version>
@@ -542,6 +540,8 @@ public:
* <[...] binary serialized identity (see Identity)>
* <[1] destination address type>
* [<[...] destination address>]
+ * <[8] 64-bit world ID of current world>
+ * <[8] 64-bit timestamp of current world>
*
* This is the only message that ever must be sent in the clear, since it
* is used to push an identity to a new peer.
@@ -566,12 +566,15 @@ public:
* <[2] software revision (of responder)>
* <[1] destination address type (for this OK, not copied from HELLO)>
* [<[...] destination address>]
+ * <[2] 16-bit length of world update or 0 if none>
+ * [[...] world update]
*
* ERROR has no payload.
*/
VERB_HELLO = 1,
- /* Error response:
+ /**
+ * Error response:
* <[1] in-re verb>
* <[8] in-re packet ID>
* <[1] error code>
@@ -579,25 +582,31 @@ public:
*/
VERB_ERROR = 2,
- /* Success response:
+ /**
+ * Success response:
* <[1] in-re verb>
* <[8] in-re packet ID>
* <[...] request-specific payload>
*/
VERB_OK = 3,
- /* Query an identity by address:
+ /**
+ * Query an identity by address:
* <[5] address to look up>
*
* OK response payload:
* <[...] binary serialized identity>
*
- * ERROR response payload:
- * <[5] address>
+ * If querying a cluster, duplicate OK responses may occasionally occur.
+ * These should be discarded.
+ *
+ * If the address is not found, no response is generated. WHOIS requests
+ * will time out much like ARP requests and similar do in L2.
*/
VERB_WHOIS = 4,
- /* Meet another node at a given protocol address:
+ /**
+ * Meet another node at a given protocol address:
* <[1] flags (unused, currently 0)>
* <[5] ZeroTier address of peer that might be found at this address>
* <[2] 16-bit protocol address port>
@@ -616,11 +625,16 @@ public:
* may also ignore these messages if a peer is not known or is not being
* actively communicated with.
*
+ * Unfortunately the physical address format in this message pre-dates
+ * InetAddress's serialization format. :( ZeroTier is four years old and
+ * yes we've accumulated a tiny bit of cruft here and there.
+ *
* No OK or ERROR is generated.
*/
VERB_RENDEZVOUS = 5,
- /* ZT-to-ZT unicast ethernet frame (shortened EXT_FRAME):
+ /**
+ * ZT-to-ZT unicast ethernet frame (shortened EXT_FRAME):
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[2] 16-bit ethertype>
* <[...] ethernet payload>
@@ -635,7 +649,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_FRAME = 6,
- /* Full Ethernet frame with MAC addressing and optional fields:
+ /**
+ * Full Ethernet frame with MAC addressing and optional fields:
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[1] flags>
* [<[...] certificate of network membership>]
@@ -658,23 +673,44 @@ public:
*/
VERB_EXT_FRAME = 7,
- /* DEPRECATED */
- VERB_P5_MULTICAST_FRAME = 8,
+ /**
+ * ECHO request (a.k.a. ping):
+ * <[...] arbitrary payload to be echoed back>
+ *
+ * This generates OK with a copy of the transmitted payload. No ERROR
+ * is generated. Response to ECHO requests is optional.
+ *
+ * Support for fragmented echo packets is optional and their use is not
+ * recommended.
+ */
+ VERB_ECHO = 8,
- /* Announce interest in multicast group(s):
+ /**
+ * Announce interest in multicast group(s):
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[6] multicast Ethernet address>
* <[4] multicast additional distinguishing information (ADI)>
* [... additional tuples of network/address/adi ...]
*
- * LIKEs are sent to peers with whom you have a direct peer to peer
- * connection, and always including root servers.
+ * LIKEs may be sent to any peer, though a good implementation should
+ * restrict them to peers on the same network they're for and to network
+ * controllers and root servers. In the current network, root servers
+ * will provide the service of final multicast cache.
+ *
+ * It is recommended that NETWORK_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE pushes be sent
+ * along with MULTICAST_LIKE when pushing LIKEs to peers that do not
+ * share a network membership (such as root servers), since this can be
+ * used to authenticate GATHER requests and limit responses to peers
+ * authorized to talk on a network. (Should be an optional field here,
+ * but saving one or two packets every five minutes is not worth an
+ * ugly hack or protocol rev.)
*
* OK/ERROR are not generated.
*/
VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE = 9,
- /* Network member certificate replication/push:
+ /**
+ * Network member certificate replication/push:
* <[...] serialized certificate of membership>
* [ ... additional certificates may follow ...]
*
@@ -685,7 +721,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_NETWORK_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE = 10,
- /* Network configuration request:
+ /**
+ * Network configuration request:
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[2] 16-bit length of request meta-data dictionary>
* <[...] string-serialized request meta-data>
@@ -720,7 +757,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST = 11,
- /* Network configuration refresh request:
+ /**
+ * Network configuration refresh request:
* <[...] array of 64-bit network IDs>
*
* This can be sent by the network controller to inform a node that it
@@ -731,7 +769,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH = 12,
- /* Request endpoints for multicast distribution:
+ /**
+ * Request endpoints for multicast distribution:
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[1] flags>
* <[6] MAC address of multicast group being queried>
@@ -747,6 +786,9 @@ public:
* to send multicast but does not have the desired number of recipient
* peers.
*
+ * More than one OK response can occur if the response is broken up across
+ * multiple packets or if querying a clustered node.
+ *
* OK response payload:
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[6] MAC address of multicast group being queried>
@@ -756,20 +798,12 @@ public:
* <[2] 16-bit number of members enumerated in this packet>
* <[...] series of 5-byte ZeroTier addresses of enumerated members>
*
- * If no endpoints are known, OK and ERROR are both optional. It's okay
- * to return nothing in that case since gathering is "lazy."
- *
- * ERROR response payload:
- * <[8] 64-bit network ID>
- * <[6] MAC address of multicast group being queried>
- * <[4] 32-bit ADI for multicast group being queried>
- *
- * ERRORs are optional and are only generated if permission is denied,
- * certificate of membership is out of date, etc.
+ * ERROR is not generated; queries that return no response are dropped.
*/
VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER = 13,
- /* Multicast frame:
+ /**
+ * Multicast frame:
* <[8] 64-bit network ID>
* <[1] flags>
* [<[...] network certificate of membership>]
@@ -810,7 +844,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME = 14,
- /* Ephemeral (PFS) key push: (UNFINISHED, NOT IMPLEMENTED YET)
+ /**
+ * Ephemeral (PFS) key push: (UNFINISHED, NOT IMPLEMENTED YET)
* <[2] flags (unused and reserved, must be 0)>
* <[2] length of padding / extra field section>
* <[...] padding / extra field section>
@@ -866,7 +901,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_SET_EPHEMERAL_KEY = 15,
- /* Push of potential endpoints for direct communication:
+ /**
+ * Push of potential endpoints for direct communication:
* <[2] 16-bit number of paths>
* <[...] paths>
*
@@ -880,13 +916,10 @@ public:
*
* Path record flags:
* 0x01 - Forget this path if it is currently known
- * 0x02 - Blacklist this path, do not use
+ * 0x02 - (Unused)
* 0x04 - Disable encryption (trust: privacy)
* 0x08 - Disable encryption and authentication (trust: ultimate)
*
- * Address types and addresses are of the same format as the destination
- * address type and address in HELLO.
- *
* The receiver may, upon receiving a push, attempt to establish a
* direct link to one or more of the indicated addresses. It is the
* responsibility of the sender to limit which peers it pushes direct
@@ -906,7 +939,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS = 16,
- /* Source-routed circuit test message:
+ /**
+ * Source-routed circuit test message:
* <[5] address of originator of circuit test>
* <[2] 16-bit flags>
* <[8] 64-bit timestamp>
@@ -984,7 +1018,8 @@ public:
*/
VERB_CIRCUIT_TEST = 17,
- /* Circuit test hop report:
+ /**
+ * Circuit test hop report:
* <[8] 64-bit timestamp (from original test)>
* <[8] 64-bit test ID (from original test)>
* <[8] 64-bit reporter timestamp (reporter's clock, 0 if unspec)>
@@ -998,6 +1033,7 @@ public:
* <[2] 16-bit error code (set to 0, currently unused)>
* <[8] 64-bit report flags (set to 0, currently unused)>
* <[8] 64-bit source packet ID>
+ * <[5] upstream ZeroTier address from which test was received>
* <[1] 8-bit source packet hop count (ZeroTier hop count)>
* <[...] local wire address on which packet was received>
* <[...] remote wire address from which packet was received>
@@ -1017,7 +1053,50 @@ public:
* If a test report is received and no circuit test was sent, it should be
* ignored. This message generates no OK or ERROR response.
*/
- VERB_CIRCUIT_TEST_REPORT = 18
+ VERB_CIRCUIT_TEST_REPORT = 18,
+
+ /**
+ * Request proof of work:
+ * <[1] 8-bit proof of work type>
+ * <[1] 8-bit proof of work difficulty>
+ * <[2] 16-bit length of proof of work challenge>
+ * <[...] proof of work challenge>
+ *
+ * This requests that a peer perform a proof of work calucation. It can be
+ * sent by highly trusted peers (e.g. root servers, network controllers)
+ * under suspected denial of service conditions in an attempt to filter
+ * out "non-serious" peers and remain responsive to those proving their
+ * intent to actually communicate.
+ *
+ * If the peer obliges to perform the work, it does so and responds with
+ * an OK containing the result. Otherwise it may ignore the message or
+ * response with an ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST or ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
+ *
+ * Proof of work type IDs:
+ * 0x01 - Salsa20/12+SHA512 hashcash function
+ *
+ * Salsa20/12+SHA512 is based on the following composite hash function:
+ *
+ * (1) Compute SHA512(candidate)
+ * (2) Use the first 256 bits of the result of #1 as a key to encrypt
+ * 131072 zero bytes with Salsa20/12 (with a zero IV).
+ * (3) Compute SHA512(the result of step #2)
+ * (4) Accept this candiate if the first [difficulty] bits of the result
+ * from step #3 are zero. Otherwise generate a new candidate and try
+ * again.
+ *
+ * This is performed repeatedly on candidates generated by appending the
+ * supplied challenge to an arbitrary nonce until a valid candidate
+ * is found. This chosen prepended nonce is then returned as the result
+ * in OK.
+ *
+ * OK payload:
+ * <[2] 16-bit length of result>
+ * <[...] computed proof of work>
+ *
+ * ERROR has no payload.
+ */
+ VERB_REQUEST_PROOF_OF_WORK = 19
};
/**
@@ -1034,7 +1113,7 @@ public:
/* Bad/unsupported protocol version */
ERROR_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 2,
- /* Unknown object queried (e.g. with WHOIS) */
+ /* Unknown object queried */
ERROR_OBJ_NOT_FOUND = 3,
/* HELLO pushed an identity whose address is already claimed */