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-rw-r--r--node/IncomingPacket.cpp35
-rw-r--r--node/Packet.hpp58
2 files changed, 46 insertions, 47 deletions
diff --git a/node/IncomingPacket.cpp b/node/IncomingPacket.cpp
index 1bf70d68..49bcae11 100644
--- a/node/IncomingPacket.cpp
+++ b/node/IncomingPacket.cpp
@@ -212,15 +212,13 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const bool alreadyAut
const unsigned int vMinor = (*this)[ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_MINOR_VERSION];
const unsigned int vRevision = at<uint16_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_REVISION);
const uint64_t timestamp = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_TIMESTAMP);
+ Identity id;
+ unsigned int ptr = ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_IDENTITY + id.deserialize(*this,ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_IDENTITY);
if (protoVersion < ZT_PROTO_VERSION_MIN) {
TRACE("dropped HELLO from %s(%s): protocol version too old",id.address().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
return true;
}
-
- Identity id;
- unsigned int ptr = ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_IDENTITY + id.deserialize(*this,ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_IDENTITY);
-
if (fromAddress != id.address()) {
TRACE("dropped HELLO from %s(%s): identity does not match packet source address",fromAddress.toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str());
return true;
@@ -301,8 +299,11 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const bool alreadyAut
// Get external surface address if present (was not in old versions)
InetAddress externalSurfaceAddress;
- if (ptr < size())
+ if (ptr < size()) {
ptr += externalSurfaceAddress.deserialize(*this,ptr);
+ if ((externalSurfaceAddress)&&(hops() == 0))
+ RR->sa->iam(id.address(),_path->localAddress(),_path->address(),externalSurfaceAddress,RR->topology->isUpstream(id),now);
+ }
// Get primary planet world ID and world timestamp if present
uint64_t planetWorldId = 0;
@@ -329,17 +330,16 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const bool alreadyAut
// Handle COR if present (older versions don't send this)
if ((ptr + 2) <= size()) {
- //const unsigned int corSize = at<uint16_t>(ptr); ptr += 2;
- ptr += 2;
- CertificateOfRepresentation cor;
- ptr += cor.deserialize(*this,ptr);
+ if (at<uint16_t>(ptr) > 0) {
+ CertificateOfRepresentation cor;
+ ptr += 2;
+ ptr += cor.deserialize(*this,ptr);
+ } else ptr += 2;
}
}
- // Learn our external surface address from other peers to help us negotiate symmetric NATs
- // and detect changes to our global IP that can trigger path renegotiation.
- if ((externalSurfaceAddress)&&(hops() == 0))
- RR->sa->iam(id.address(),_path->localAddress(),_path->address(),externalSurfaceAddress,RR->topology->isUpstream(id),now);
+ // Send OK(HELLO) with an echo of the packet's timestamp and some of the same
+ // information about us: version, sent-to address, etc.
Packet outp(id.address(),RR->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_OK);
outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
@@ -466,10 +466,11 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doOK(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,const SharedPtr<Peer> &p
// Handle COR if present (older versions don't send this)
if ((ptr + 2) <= size()) {
- //const unsigned int corSize = at<uint16_t>(ptr); ptr += 2;
- ptr += 2;
- CertificateOfRepresentation cor;
- ptr += cor.deserialize(*this,ptr);
+ if (at<uint16_t>(ptr) > 0) {
+ CertificateOfRepresentation cor;
+ ptr += 2;
+ ptr += cor.deserialize(*this,ptr);
+ } else ptr += 2;
}
TRACE("%s(%s): OK(HELLO), version %u.%u.%u, latency %u, reported external address %s",source().toString().c_str(),_path->address().toString().c_str(),vMajor,vMinor,vRevision,latency,((externalSurfaceAddress) ? externalSurfaceAddress.toString().c_str() : "(none)"));
diff --git a/node/Packet.hpp b/node/Packet.hpp
index 03bd9ed3..4859dafd 100644
--- a/node/Packet.hpp
+++ b/node/Packet.hpp
@@ -538,8 +538,7 @@ public:
* <[2] software revision>
* <[8] timestamp for determining latency>
* <[...] binary serialized identity (see Identity)>
- * <[1] destination address type>
- * [<[...] destination address to which packet was sent>]
+ * <[...] physical destination address of packet>
* <[8] 64-bit world ID of current planet>
* <[8] 64-bit timestamp of current planet>
* [... remainder if packet is encrypted using cryptField() ...]
@@ -547,40 +546,39 @@ public:
* [<[1] 8-bit type ID of moon>]
* [<[8] 64-bit world ID of moon>]
* [<[8] 64-bit timestamp of moon>]
- * [... additional moons ...]
+ * [... additional moon type/ID/timestamp tuples ...]
* <[2] 16-bit length of certificate of representation>
* [... certificate of representation ...]
*
- * The initial fields of HELLO are sent in the clear. Fields after the
- * planet definition (which are common knowledge) are however encrypted
- * using the cryptField() function. The packet is MAC'd as usual using
- * the same MAC construct as other packets.
- *
- * The destination address is the wire address to which this packet is
- * being sent, and in OK is *also* the destination address of the OK
- * packet. This can be used by the receiver to detect NAT, learn its real
- * external address if behind NAT, and detect changes to its external
- * address that require re-establishing connectivity.
- *
- * Destination address types and formats (not all of these are used now):
- * 0x00 - None -- no destination address data present
- * 0x01 - Ethernet address -- format: <[6] Ethernet MAC>
- * 0x04 - 6-byte IPv4 UDP address/port -- format: <[4] IP>, <[2] port>
- * 0x06 - 18-byte IPv6 UDP address/port -- format: <[16] IP>, <[2] port>
- *
- * OK payload (note that OK is encrypted):
- * <[8] timestamp (echoed from original HELLO)>
- * <[1] protocol version (of responder)>
- * <[1] software major version (of responder)>
- * <[1] software minor version (of responder)>
- * <[2] software revision (of responder)>
- * <[1] destination address type (for this OK, not copied from HELLO)>
- * [<[...] destination address>]
- * <[2] 16-bit length of world update or 0 if none>
+ * HELLO is sent in the clear as it is how peers share their identity
+ * public keys. A few additional fields are sent in the clear too, but
+ * these are things that are public info or are easy to determine. As
+ * of 1.2.0 we have added a few more fields, but since these could have
+ * the potential to be sensitive we introduced the encryption of the
+ * remainder of the packet. See cryptField(). Packet MAC is still
+ * performed of course, so authentication occurs as normal.
+ *
+ * Destination address is the actual wire address to which the packet
+ * was sent. See InetAddress::serialize() for format.
+ *
+ * OK payload:
+ * <[8] HELLO timestamp field echo>
+ * <[1] protocol version>
+ * <[1] software major version>
+ * <[1] software minor version>
+ * <[2] software revision>
+ * <[...] physical destination address of packet>
+ * <[2] 16-bit length of world update(s) or 0 if none>
* [[...] updates to planets and/or moons]
- * <[2] 16-bit length of certificate of representation (of responder)>
+ * <[2] 16-bit length of certificate of representation>
* [... certificate of representation ...]
*
+ * With the exception of the timestamp, the other fields pertain to the
+ * respondent who is sending OK and are not echoes.
+ *
+ * Note that OK is fully encrypted so no selective cryptField() of
+ * potentially sensitive fields is needed.
+ *
* ERROR has no payload.
*/
VERB_HELLO = 0x01,
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-21 21:32:03 +0000