diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'README.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 225 |
1 files changed, 170 insertions, 55 deletions
@@ -22,45 +22,51 @@ Here's the template: ******************************************************************************* ### What organization or people are asking to have this signed? ******************************************************************************* -Organization name and website: -[your text here] +Organization name and website: +VyOS Networks (VyOS Inc) + +12585 Kirkham Ct, Suite 1 +Poway, California 92604 +United States of America + +Email: sales@vyos.io https://vyos.io ******************************************************************************* ### What's the legal data that proves the organization's genuineness? The reviewers should be able to easily verify, that your organization is a legal entity, to prevent abuse. Provide the information, which can prove the genuineness with certainty. ******************************************************************************* -Company/tax register entries or equivalent: -(a link to the organization entry in your jurisdiction's register will do) +Company/tax register entries or equivalent: +(a link to the organization entry in your jurisdiction's register will do) -[your text here] +https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_ca/4578449 -The public details of both your organization and the issuer in the EV certificate used for signing .cab files at Microsoft Hardware Dev Center File Signing Services. +The public details of both your organization and the issuer in the EV certificate used for signing .cab files at Microsoft Hardware Dev Center File Signing Services. (**not** the CA certificate embedded in your shim binary) -Example: - ``` -Issuer: O=MyIssuer, Ltd., CN=MyIssuer EV Code Signing CA -Subject: C=XX, O=MyCompany, Inc., CN=MyCompany, Inc. +Issuer: O = SSL Corp, CN = SSL.com EV Code Signing Intermediate CA RSA R3 +Subject: C = US, VyOS Networks (VyOS Inc), CN = VyOS Inc ``` -[your text here] - ******************************************************************************* ### What product or service is this for? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +VyOS is a fully open-source, enterprise-grade router platform. ******************************************************************************* ### What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +VyOS is a software only product. We do not control our users systems/hardware. ******************************************************************************* ### Why are you unable to reuse shim from another distro that is already signed? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +VyOS is Debian (bookworm - and soon trixie) based. We have our own custom Kernel +built by us to provide a stable experience for our (enterprise) users. ******************************************************************************* ### Who is the primary contact for security updates, etc.? @@ -69,10 +75,10 @@ The security contacts need to be verified before the shim can be accepted. For s An authorized reviewer will initiate contact verification by sending each security contact a PGP-encrypted email containing random words. You will be asked to post the contents of these mails in your `shim-review` issue to prove ownership of the email addresses and PGP keys. ******************************************************************************* -- Name: -- Position: -- Email address: -- PGP key fingerprint: +- Name: Christian Breunig +- Position: Software Developer +- Email address: christian@breunig.cc +- PGP key fingerprint: 98D3 C8D2 EEF1 896E EBB5 260C 034E 04D5 3FB8 7A81 (Key should be signed by the other security contacts, pushed to a keyserver like keyserver.ubuntu.com, and preferably have signatures that are reasonably @@ -81,10 +87,10 @@ well known in the Linux community.) ******************************************************************************* ### Who is the secondary contact for security updates, etc.? ******************************************************************************* -- Name: -- Position: -- Email address: -- PGP key fingerprint: +- Name: Daniil Baturin +- Position: Chief Technology Officer +- Email address: daniil@baturin.org +- PGP key fingerprint: E8AE FF29 318E EAEB A007 2538 0FBA 4E27 36B7 F57A (Key should be signed by the other security contacts, pushed to a keyserver like keyserver.ubuntu.com, and preferably have signatures that are reasonably @@ -123,7 +129,8 @@ authentic, please confirm this here with a simple *yes*. A short guide on verifying public keys and signatures should be available in the [docs](./docs/) directory. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +*yes* ******************************************************************************* ### URL for a repo that contains the exact code which was built to result in your binary: @@ -131,26 +138,33 @@ Hint: If you attach all the patches and modifications that are being used to you You can also point to your custom git servers, where the code is hosted. ******************************************************************************* -[your url here] + +* https://github.com/vyos/shim-review +* https://github.com/vyos/efi-boot-shim ******************************************************************************* ### What patches are being applied and why: Mention all the external patches and build process modifications, which are used during your building process, that make your shim binary be the exact one that you posted as part of this application. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Patch from rhboot/shim#739 + +Some VyOS releases will get secure-boot enabled later in their release cycle but are based on Debian Bookworm and we wan't to reuse the signed SHIM. ******************************************************************************* ### Do you have the NX bit set in your shim? If so, is your entire boot stack NX-compatible and what testing have you done to ensure such compatibility? See https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/hardware-dev-center/nx-exception-for-shim-community/ba-p/3976522 for more details on the signing of shim without NX bit. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +No, not yet - we are waiting for the rest of our boot stack to support it before enabling it. ******************************************************************************* ### What exact implementation of Secure Boot in GRUB2 do you have? (Either Upstream GRUB2 shim_lock verifier or Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical-like implementation) Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +We re-use Debians version of GRUB2 - this is why we also include the `Debian Secure Boot CA` in this shim binary for maximum compatibility. ******************************************************************************* ### Do you have fixes for all the following GRUB2 CVEs applied? @@ -195,21 +209,24 @@ Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2. * CVE-2023-4693 * CVE-2023-4692 ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Yes - we're reusing Debian 12 and Debian 13 GRUB2 versions ******************************************************************************* ### If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader, and if these fixes have been applied, is the upstream global SBAT generation in your GRUB2 binary set to 4? Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2, otherwise do you have an entry in your GRUB2 binary similar to: `grub,4,Free Software Foundation,grub,GRUB_UPSTREAM_VERSION,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/`? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +We're reusing Debian 12 and Debian 13 GRUB2 versions ******************************************************************************* ### Were old shims hashes provided to Microsoft for verification and to be added to future DBX updates? ### Does your new chain of trust disallow booting old GRUB2 builds affected by the CVEs? If you had no previous signed shim, say so here. Otherwise a simple _yes_ will do. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +No previous signed shim ******************************************************************************* ### If your boot chain of trust includes a Linux kernel: @@ -219,31 +236,37 @@ If you had no previous signed shim, say so here. Otherwise a simple _yes_ will d Hint: upstream kernels should have all these applied, but if you ship your own heavily-modified older kernel version, that is being maintained separately from upstream, this may not be the case. If you are shipping an older kernel, double-check your sources; maybe you do not have all the patches, but ship a configuration, that does not expose the issue(s). ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] +Yes - our Kernels are 6.6 or higher ******************************************************************************* ### How does your signed kernel enforce lockdown when your system runs ### with Secure Boot enabled? Hint: If it does not, we are not likely to sign your shim. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Using all the standard upstream mechanisms/security features, most prominently the lockdown LSM. ******************************************************************************* ### Do you build your signed kernel with additional local patches? What do they do? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Yes. https://github.com/vyos/vyos-build/tree/current/scripts/package-build/linux-kernel/patches/kernel + +These include networking patches and inotify support for stackable filesystems. ******************************************************************************* ### Do you use an ephemeral key for signing kernel modules? ### If not, please describe how you ensure that one kernel build does not load modules built for another kernel. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Yes ******************************************************************************* ### If you use vendor_db functionality of providing multiple certificates and/or hashes please briefly describe your certificate setup. ### If there are allow-listed hashes please provide exact binaries for which hashes are created via file sharing service, available in public with anonymous access for verification. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +In addition to our `VyOS Networks Secure Boot CA` we also embed the `Debian Secure Boot CA` in order to re-use their bianry components like GRUB2. ******************************************************************************* ### If you are re-using the CA certificate from your last shim binary, you will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries exposed to the CVEs mentioned earlier to vendor_dbx in shim. Please describe your strategy. @@ -251,7 +274,8 @@ This ensures that your new shim+GRUB2 can no longer chainload those older GRUB2 If this is your first application or you're using a new CA certificate, please say so here. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +This is out first application ******************************************************************************* ### Is the Dockerfile in your repository the recipe for reproducing the building of your shim binary? @@ -261,13 +285,16 @@ Hint: Prefer using *frozen* packages for your toolchain, since an update to GCC, If your shim binaries can't be reproduced using the provided Dockerfile, please explain why that's the case, what the differences would be and what build environment (OS and toolchain) is being used to reproduce this build? In this case please write a detailed guide, how to setup this build environment from scratch. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Yes ******************************************************************************* ### Which files in this repo are the logs for your build? This should include logs for creating the buildroots, applying patches, doing the build, creating the archives, etc. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +* [shim_16.0-1+vyos1_amd64.build](shim_16.0-1+vyos1_amd64.build) +* [shim_16.0-1+vyos1_amd64.buildinfo](shim_16.0-1+vyos1_amd64.buildinfo) ******************************************************************************* ### What changes were made in the distro's secure boot chain since your SHIM was last signed? @@ -275,24 +302,28 @@ For example, signing new kernel's variants, UKI, systemd-boot, new certs, new CA Skip this, if this is your first application for having shim signed. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +SKIP - first application ******************************************************************************* ### What is the SHA256 hash of your final shim binary? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +`64c945dd275a6d95cb97a79a208b3ddcc6fb42706e67de58206c77d023c7ef99` ******************************************************************************* ### How do you manage and protect the keys used in your shim? Describe the security strategy that is used for key protection. This can range from using hardware tokens like HSMs or Smartcards, air-gapped vaults, physical safes to other good practices. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +The keys are stored on a FIPS certified HSM with restricted access. ******************************************************************************* ### Do you use EV certificates as embedded certificates in the shim? A _yes_ or _no_ will do. There's no penalty for the latter. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +No ******************************************************************************* ### Are you embedding a CA certificate in your shim? @@ -301,7 +332,40 @@ if _yes_: does that certificate include the X509v3 Basic Constraints to say that it is a CA? See the [docs](./docs/) for more guidance about this. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Yes + +For the well known `Debian Secure Boot CA` + +``` +X509v3 extensions: + Authority Information Access: + CA Issuers - URI:https://dsa.debian.org/secure-boot-ca + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 6C:CE:CE:7E:4C:6C:0D:1F:61:49:F3:DD:27:DF:CC:5C:BB:41:9E:A1 + Netscape Cert Type: critical + SSL Client, SSL Server, S/MIME, Object Signing, SSL CA, S/MIME CA, Object Signing CA + X509v3 Extended Key Usage: + Code Signing + X509v3 Key Usage: critical + Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:TRUE + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 6C:CE:CE:7E:4C:6C:0D:1F:61:49:F3:DD:27:DF:CC:5C:BB:41:9E:A1 +``` + +For `VyOS Networks Secure Boot CA` + +``` +X509v3 extensions: + X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: + 78:99:6C:D5:B5:0A:E3:7A:C8:DB:82:85:DF:94:6F:57:F1:D1:E5:46 + X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: + 78:99:6C:D5:B5:0A:E3:7A:C8:DB:82:85:DF:94:6F:57:F1:D1:E5:46 + X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical + CA:TRUE +``` ******************************************************************************* ### Do you add a vendor-specific SBAT entry to the SBAT section in each binary that supports SBAT metadata ( GRUB2, fwupd, fwupdate, systemd-boot, systemd-stub, shim + all child shim binaries )? @@ -314,7 +378,13 @@ If you are using a downstream implementation of GRUB2 (e.g. from Fedora or Debia Hint: run `objcopy --only-section .sbat -O binary YOUR_EFI_BINARY /dev/stdout` to get these entries. Paste them here. Preferably surround each listing with three backticks (\`\`\`), so they render well. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +shim: +``` +sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md +shim,4,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim +shim.vyos,1,VyOS,shim,16.0,https://github.com/vyos/efi-boot-shim.git +``` ******************************************************************************* ### If shim is loading GRUB2 bootloader, which modules are built into your signed GRUB2 image? @@ -322,45 +392,85 @@ Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2. Hint: this is about those modules that are in the binary itself, not the `.mod` files in your filesystem. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +``` +all_video boot btrfs cat chain configfile cpuid cryptodisk echo +efifwsetup efinet ext2 f2fs fat fdt font gcry_arcfour gcry_blowfish +gcry_camellia gcry_cast5 gcry_crc gcry_des gcry_dsa gcry_idea gcry_md4 +gcry_md5 gcry_rfc2268 gcry_rijndael gcry_rmd160 gcry_rsa gcry_seed +gcry_serpent gcry_sha1 gcry_sha256 gcry_sha512 gcry_tiger gcry_twofish +gcry_whirlpool gettext gfxmenu gfxterm gfxterm_background gzio +halt help hfsplus http iso9660 jfs jpeg keystatus linux loadenv +loopback ls lsefi lsefimmap lsefisystab lssal luks luks2 lvm mdraid09 +mdraid1x memdisk minicmd normal ntfs part_apple part_gpt part_msdos +password_pbkdf2 peimage play png probe raid5rec raid6rec reboot regexp +search search_fs_file search_fs_uuid search_label serial sleep smbios +squash4 test tftp tpm true video xfs zfs zfscrypt zfsinfo +``` ******************************************************************************* ### If you are using systemd-boot on arm64 or riscv, is the fix for [unverified Devicetree Blob loading](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/advisories/GHSA-6m6p-rjcq-334c) included? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +We only support amd64/x86_64 at the moment. ******************************************************************************* ### What is the origin and full version number of your bootloader (GRUB2 or systemd-boot or other)? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +* grub-efi-amd64 (2.06-13+deb12u1) ******************************************************************************* ### If your shim launches any other components apart from your bootloader, please provide further details on what is launched. Hint: The most common case here will be a firmware updater like fwupd. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Not applicable ******************************************************************************* ### If your GRUB2 or systemd-boot launches any other binaries that are not the Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode, please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown. Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2 or systemd-boot. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +It will only launch Linux in SecureBoot mode. ******************************************************************************* ### How do the launched components prevent execution of unauthenticated code? Summarize in one or two sentences, how your secure bootchain works on higher level. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +GRUB is built with SecureBoot support, the Linux kernel with Lockdown support. + +systemd-boot is currently not used ******************************************************************************* ### Does your shim load any loaders that support loading unsigned kernels (e.g. certain GRUB2 configurations)? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +No ******************************************************************************* ### What kernel are you using? Which patches and configuration does it include to enforce Secure Boot? ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Currently 6.6 - soon 6.12 or newer LTS version. + +Relevant KConfig values: + +``` +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512=y +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH="sha512" +# CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS is not set +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY="certs/signing_key.pem" +CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y +CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS="" +``` + +We might add an intermediate key to CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS for additional module signing. ******************************************************************************* ### What contributions have you made to help us review the applications of other applicants? @@ -370,9 +480,14 @@ A reasonable timeframe of waiting for a review can reach 2-3 months. Helping us For newcomers, the applications labeled as [*easy to review*](https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3A%22easy+to+review%22) are recommended to start the contribution process. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +I tried to read up as much other applications for a SHIM to understand your work and effort and not waste anyones time. + +I plan to start by reviewing issues tagged [*easy to review*](https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3A%22easy+to+review%22) to contribute. ******************************************************************************* ### Add any additional information you think we may need to validate this shim signing application. ******************************************************************************* -[your text here] + +Thank you for your effort! + |