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| author | Yuriy Andamasov <yuriy@vyos.io> | 2026-05-10 22:26:48 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Yuriy Andamasov <yuriy@vyos.io> | 2026-05-10 22:26:48 +0300 |
| commit | e39d9b2c79f7f1c06004d551f3c22f5d866e401a (patch) | |
| tree | a23ad359d0f89fa1ae87294d47a56cf7f825406d /docs/_include/interface-common.txt | |
| parent | bab5cf059d26735b5f13b621e75c2d56ba8e5b81 (diff) | |
| download | vyos-documentation-e39d9b2c79f7f1c06004d551f3c22f5d866e401a.tar.gz vyos-documentation-e39d9b2c79f7f1c06004d551f3c22f5d866e401a.zip | |
fix(ci): reject path traversal in fork-controlled diff entries
Copilot finding on .github/workflows/ai-validation.yml:64 — defense
in depth:
Even though git's tree machinery generally rejects `..` segments
and absolute paths at commit time, treat fork-controlled diff
input as untrusted. A path like `docs/../../outside.md` would
let `git show HEAD:<path>` write to `_changed_md/../../outside.md`,
which resolves to a sibling of `_changed_md/` — escaping the
artifact directory and writing into the runner workspace.
Mitigation: validate each path before any mkdir/redirect. Reject:
- absolute paths (`/foo`)
- interior `..` segments (`foo/../bar`)
- leading `..` (`../foo`)
- trailing `..` (`foo/..`)
- bare `..`
Combined with the existing symlink/submodule mode check, the
prepare job now refuses to bundle any tree entry whose path or
type could escape the artifact boundary.
Suppressed-by-Copilot finding (line 68, id-token: write):
Same pushback as previous rounds. claude-code-action@v1 uses OIDC
internally (verified via vyos/vyos-documentation commit b18a399c).
Keeping as-is.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/_include/interface-common.txt')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
