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-rw-r--r--src/charon/sa/keymat.c568
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diff --git a/src/charon/sa/keymat.c b/src/charon/sa/keymat.c
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+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Martin Willi
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * $Id$
+ */
+
+#include "keymat.h"
+
+#include <daemon.h>
+#include <crypto/prf_plus.h>
+
+typedef struct private_keymat_t private_keymat_t;
+
+/**
+ * Private data of an keymat_t object.
+ */
+struct private_keymat_t {
+
+ /**
+ * Public keymat_t interface.
+ */
+ keymat_t public;
+
+ /**
+ * IKE_SA Role, initiator or responder
+ */
+ bool initiator;
+
+ /**
+ * inbound signer (verify)
+ */
+ signer_t *signer_in;
+
+ /**
+ * outbound signer (sign)
+ */
+ signer_t *signer_out;
+
+ /**
+ * inbound crypter (decrypt)
+ */
+ crypter_t *crypter_in;
+
+ /**
+ * outbound crypter (encrypt)
+ */
+ crypter_t *crypter_out;
+
+ /**
+ * General purpose PRF
+ */
+ prf_t *prf;
+
+ /**
+ * Key to derive key material from for CHILD_SAs, rekeying
+ */
+ chunk_t skd;
+
+ /**
+ * Key to build outging authentication data (SKp)
+ */
+ chunk_t skp_build;
+
+ /**
+ * Key to verify incoming authentication data (SKp)
+ */
+ chunk_t skp_verify;
+};
+
+typedef struct keylen_entry_t keylen_entry_t;
+
+/**
+ * Implicit key length for an algorithm
+ */
+struct keylen_entry_t {
+ /** IKEv2 algorithm identifier */
+ int algo;
+ /** key length in bits */
+ int len;
+};
+
+#define END_OF_LIST -1
+
+/**
+ * Keylen for encryption algos
+ */
+keylen_entry_t keylen_enc[] = {
+ {ENCR_DES, 64},
+ {ENCR_3DES, 192},
+ {END_OF_LIST, 0}
+};
+
+/**
+ * Keylen for integrity algos
+ */
+keylen_entry_t keylen_int[] = {
+ {AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, 128},
+ {AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, 160},
+ {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, 256},
+ {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192, 384},
+ {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256, 512},
+ {AUTH_AES_XCBC_96, 128},
+ {END_OF_LIST, 0}
+};
+
+/**
+ * Lookup key length of an algorithm
+ */
+static int lookup_keylen(keylen_entry_t *list, int algo)
+{
+ while (list->algo != END_OF_LIST)
+ {
+ if (algo == list->algo)
+ {
+ return list->len;
+ }
+ list++;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.create_dh
+ */
+static diffie_hellman_t* create_dh(private_keymat_t *this,
+ diffie_hellman_group_t group)
+{
+ return lib->crypto->create_dh(lib->crypto, group);;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.derive_keys
+ */
+static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
+ diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i,
+ chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
+ private_keymat_t *rekey)
+{
+ chunk_t skeyseed, key, secret, full_nonce, fixed_nonce, prf_plus_seed;
+ chunk_t spi_i, spi_r;
+ crypter_t *crypter_i, *crypter_r;
+ signer_t *signer_i, *signer_r;
+ prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
+ u_int16_t alg, key_size;
+
+ spi_i = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
+ spi_r = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
+
+ if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Create SAs general purpose PRF first, we may use it here */
+ if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION, &alg, NULL))
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected",
+ transform_type_names, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ this->prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, alg);
+ if (this->prf == NULL)
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!",
+ transform_type_names, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION,
+ pseudo_random_function_names, alg);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "shared Diffie Hellman secret %B", &secret);
+ /* full nonce is used as seed for PRF+ ... */
+ full_nonce = chunk_cat("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r);
+ /* but the PRF may need a fixed key which only uses the first bytes of
+ * the nonces. */
+ switch (alg)
+ {
+ case PRF_AES128_XCBC:
+ /* while rfc4434 defines variable keys for AES-XCBC, rfc3664 does
+ * not and therefore fixed key semantics apply to XCBC for key
+ * derivation. */
+ key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf)/2;
+ nonce_i.len = min(nonce_i.len, key_size);
+ nonce_r.len = min(nonce_r.len, key_size);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* all other algorithms use variable key length, full nonce */
+ break;
+ }
+ fixed_nonce = chunk_cat("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r);
+ *((u_int64_t*)spi_i.ptr) = id->get_initiator_spi(id);
+ *((u_int64_t*)spi_r.ptr) = id->get_responder_spi(id);
+ prf_plus_seed = chunk_cat("ccc", full_nonce, spi_i, spi_r);
+
+ /* KEYMAT = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
+ *
+ * if we are rekeying, SKEYSEED is built on another way
+ */
+ if (rekey == NULL) /* not rekeying */
+ {
+ /* SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir) */
+ this->prf->set_key(this->prf, fixed_nonce);
+ this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, secret, &skeyseed);
+ this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skeyseed);
+ prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, prf_plus_seed);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), [g^ir (new)] | Ni | Nr)
+ * use OLD SAs PRF functions for both prf_plus and prf */
+ secret = chunk_cat("mc", secret, full_nonce);
+ rekey->prf->set_key(rekey->prf, rekey->skd);
+ rekey->prf->allocate_bytes(rekey->prf, secret, &skeyseed);
+ rekey->prf->set_key(rekey->prf, skeyseed);
+ prf_plus = prf_plus_create(rekey->prf, prf_plus_seed);
+ }
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYSEED %B", &skeyseed);
+
+ chunk_clear(&skeyseed);
+ chunk_clear(&secret);
+ chunk_free(&full_nonce);
+ chunk_free(&fixed_nonce);
+ chunk_clear(&prf_plus_seed);
+
+ /* KEYMAT = SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr */
+
+ /* SK_d is used for generating CHILD_SA key mat => store for later use */
+ key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &this->skd);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_d secret %B", &this->skd);
+
+ /* SK_ai/SK_ar used for integrity protection => signer_in/signer_out */
+ if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, &alg, NULL))
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected",
+ transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ signer_i = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, alg);
+ signer_r = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, alg);
+ if (signer_i == NULL || signer_r == NULL)
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!",
+ transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM,
+ integrity_algorithm_names ,alg);
+ prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ key_size = signer_i->get_key_size(signer_i);
+
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ai secret %B", &key);
+ signer_i->set_key(signer_i, key);
+ chunk_clear(&key);
+
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ar secret %B", &key);
+ signer_r->set_key(signer_r, key);
+ chunk_clear(&key);
+
+ if (this->initiator)
+ {
+ this->signer_in = signer_r;
+ this->signer_out = signer_i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ this->signer_in = signer_i;
+ this->signer_out = signer_r;
+ }
+
+ /* SK_ei/SK_er used for encryption => crypter_in/crypter_out */
+ if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &alg, &key_size))
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected",
+ transform_type_names, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ crypter_i = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size / 8);
+ crypter_r = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size / 8);
+ if (crypter_i == NULL || crypter_r == NULL)
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N (key size %d) not supported!",
+ transform_type_names, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
+ encryption_algorithm_names, alg, key_size);
+ prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ key_size = crypter_i->get_key_size(crypter_i);
+
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", &key);
+ crypter_i->set_key(crypter_i, key);
+ chunk_clear(&key);
+
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", &key);
+ crypter_r->set_key(crypter_r, key);
+ chunk_clear(&key);
+
+ if (this->initiator)
+ {
+ this->crypter_in = crypter_r;
+ this->crypter_out = crypter_i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ this->crypter_in = crypter_i;
+ this->crypter_out = crypter_r;
+ }
+
+ /* SK_pi/SK_pr used for authentication => stored for later */
+ key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pi secret %B", &key);
+ if (this->initiator)
+ {
+ this->skp_build = key;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ this->skp_verify = key;
+ }
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pr secret %B", &key);
+ if (this->initiator)
+ {
+ this->skp_verify = key;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ this->skp_build = key;
+ }
+
+ /* all done, prf_plus not needed anymore */
+ prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.derive_child_keys
+ */
+static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
+ proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
+ chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
+ chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
+ chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
+{
+ u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
+ chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
+ prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
+
+ if (dh)
+ {
+ if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret);
+ }
+ seed = chunk_cata("mcc", secret, nonce_i, nonce_r);
+ DBG4(DBG_CHD, "seed %B", &seed);
+
+ if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
+ &enc_alg, &enc_size))
+ {
+ DBG2(DBG_CHD, " using %N for encryption",
+ encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
+
+ if (!enc_size)
+ {
+ enc_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_enc, enc_alg);
+ }
+ if (!enc_size)
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_CHD, "no keylenth defined for %N",
+ encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ /* to bytes */
+ enc_size /= 8;
+
+ /* CCM/GCM needs additional bytes */
+ switch (enc_alg)
+ {
+ case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV8:
+ case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV12:
+ case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV16:
+ enc_size += 3;
+ break;
+ case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV8:
+ case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV12:
+ case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV16:
+ enc_size += 4;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM,
+ &int_alg, &int_size))
+ {
+ DBG2(DBG_CHD, " using %N for integrity",
+ integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
+
+ if (!int_size)
+ {
+ int_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_int, int_alg);
+ }
+ if (!int_size)
+ {
+ DBG1(DBG_CHD, "no keylenth defined for %N",
+ integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ /* to bytes */
+ int_size /= 8;
+ }
+
+ this->prf->set_key(this->prf, this->skd);
+ prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, seed);
+
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i);
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i);
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r);
+ prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r);
+
+ prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.get_signer
+ */
+static signer_t* get_signer(private_keymat_t *this, bool in)
+{
+ return in ? this->signer_in : this->signer_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.get_crypter
+ */
+static crypter_t* get_crypter(private_keymat_t *this, bool in)
+{
+ return in ? this->crypter_in : this->crypter_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.get_auth_octets
+ */
+static chunk_t get_auth_octets(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
+ chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
+ identification_t *id)
+{
+ chunk_t chunk, idx, octets;
+ chunk_t skp;
+
+ skp = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build;
+
+ chunk = chunk_alloca(4);
+ memset(chunk.ptr, 0, chunk.len);
+ chunk.ptr[0] = id->get_type(id);
+ idx = chunk_cata("cc", chunk, id->get_encoding(id));
+
+ DBG3(DBG_IKE, "IDx' %B", &idx);
+ DBG3(DBG_IKE, "SK_p %B", &skp);
+ this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skp);
+ this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, idx, &chunk);
+
+ octets = chunk_cat("ccm", ike_sa_init, nonce, chunk);
+ DBG3(DBG_IKE, "octets = message + nonce + prf(Sk_px, IDx') %B", &octets);
+ return octets;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Key pad for the AUTH method SHARED_KEY_MESSAGE_INTEGRITY_CODE.
+ */
+#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD "Key Pad for IKEv2"
+#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH 17
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.get_psk_sig
+ */
+static chunk_t get_psk_sig(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
+ chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret,
+ identification_t *id)
+{
+ chunk_t key_pad, key, sig, octets;
+
+ if (!secret.len)
+ { /* EAP uses SK_p if no MSK has been established */
+ secret = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build;
+ }
+ octets = get_auth_octets(this, verify, ike_sa_init, nonce, id);
+ /* AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>) */
+ key_pad = chunk_create(IKEV2_KEY_PAD, IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH);
+ this->prf->set_key(this->prf, secret);
+ this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, key_pad, &key);
+ this->prf->set_key(this->prf, key);
+ this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, octets, &sig);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "secret %B", &secret);
+ DBG4(DBG_IKE, "prf(secret, keypad) %B", &key);
+ DBG3(DBG_IKE, "AUTH = prf(prf(secret, keypad), octets) %B", &sig);
+ chunk_free(&octets);
+ chunk_free(&key);
+
+ return sig;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implementation of keymat_t.destroy.
+ */
+static void destroy(private_keymat_t *this)
+{
+ DESTROY_IF(this->signer_in);
+ DESTROY_IF(this->signer_out);
+ DESTROY_IF(this->crypter_in);
+ DESTROY_IF(this->crypter_out);
+ DESTROY_IF(this->prf);
+ chunk_clear(&this->skd);
+ chunk_clear(&this->skp_verify);
+ chunk_clear(&this->skp_build);
+ free(this);
+}
+
+/**
+ * See header
+ */
+keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator)
+{
+ private_keymat_t *this = malloc_thing(private_keymat_t);
+
+ this->public.create_dh = (diffie_hellman_t*(*)(keymat_t*, diffie_hellman_group_t group))create_dh;
+ this->public.derive_ike_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id, keymat_t *rekey))derive_ike_keys;
+ this->public.derive_child_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r))derive_child_keys;
+ this->public.get_signer = (signer_t*(*)(keymat_t*, bool in))get_signer;
+ this->public.get_crypter = (crypter_t*(*)(keymat_t*, bool in))get_crypter;
+ this->public.get_auth_octets = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t *, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id))get_auth_octets;
+ this->public.get_psk_sig = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t*, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id))get_psk_sig;
+ this->public.destroy = (void(*)(keymat_t*))destroy;
+
+ this->initiator = initiator;
+
+ this->signer_in = NULL;
+ this->signer_out = NULL;
+ this->crypter_in = NULL;
+ this->crypter_out = NULL;
+ this->prf = NULL;
+ this->skd = chunk_empty;
+ this->skp_verify = chunk_empty;
+ this->skp_build = chunk_empty;
+
+ return &this->public;
+}
+
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-10 09:56:10 +0000