Revert lots of Cryptlib updates.

OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys
I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker.

Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed
but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test
data to match the bug.

So that's pretty broken.

For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in
the wild to work.

This reverts commit 513cbe2aea689bf968f171f894f3d4cdb43524d5.
This reverts commit e9cc33d6f2b7f35c6f5e349fd83fb9ae0bc66226.
This reverts commit 80d49f758ead0180bfe6161931838e0578248303.
This reverts commit 9bc647e2b23bcfd69a0077c0717fbc454c919a57.
This reverts commit ae75df6232ad30f3e8736e9449692d58a7439260.
This reverts commit e883479f35644d17db7efed710657c8543cfcb68.
This reverts commit 97469449fda5ba933a64280917e776487301a127.
This reverts commit e39692647f78e13d757ddbfdd36f440d5f526050.
This reverts commit 0f3dfc01e2d5e7df882c963dd8dc4a0dfbfc96ad.
This reverts commit 4da6ac819510c7cc4ba21d7a735d69b45daa5873.
This reverts commit d064bd7eef201f26cb926450a76260b5187ac689.
This reverts commit 9bc86cfd6f9387f0da9d5c0102b6aa5627e91c91.
This reverts commit ab9a05a10f16b33f7ee1e9da360c7801eebdb9d2.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 265 deletions

diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
deleted file mode 100644
index fa13732b..00000000
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
-                        const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
-                        const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
-                        unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
-
-#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
-
-/* TLS KDF pkey context structure */
-
-typedef struct {
-    /* Digest to use for PRF */
-    const EVP_MD *md;
-    /* Secret value to use for PRF */
-    unsigned char *sec;
-    size_t seclen;
-    /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
-    unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
-    size_t seedlen;
-} TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX;
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
-
-    kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
-    if (kctx == NULL)
-        return 0;
-    ctx->data = kctx;
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static void pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
-    OPENSSL_free(kctx);
-}
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
-{
-    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-    switch (type) {
-    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD:
-        kctx->md = p2;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET:
-        if (p1 < 0)
-            return 0;
-        if (kctx->sec != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
-        kctx->seedlen = 0;
-        kctx->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
-        if (kctx->sec == NULL)
-            return 0;
-        kctx->seclen  = p1;
-        return 1;
-
-    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED:
-        if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
-            return 1;
-        if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - kctx->seedlen))
-            return 0;
-        memcpy(kctx->seed + kctx->seedlen, p2, p1);
-        kctx->seedlen += p1;
-        return 1;
-
-    default:
-        return -2;
-
-    }
-}
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
-                                  const char *type, const char *value)
-{
-    if (value == NULL) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) {
-        TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-
-        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
-        if (md == NULL) {
-            KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        kctx->md = md;
-        return 1;
-    }
-    if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
-        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
-        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
-    if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
-        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
-    if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
-        return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
-    return -2;
-}
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
-                                size_t *keylen)
-{
-    TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-    if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->sec == NULL || kctx->seedlen == 0) {
-        KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return tls1_prf_alg(kctx->md, kctx->sec, kctx->seclen,
-                        kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen,
-                        key, *keylen);
-}
-
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth = {
-    EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF,
-    0,
-    pkey_tls1_prf_init,
-    0,
-    pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup,
-
-    0, 0,
-    0, 0,
-
-    0,
-    0,
-
-    0,
-    0,
-
-    0, 0,
-
-    0, 0, 0, 0,
-
-    0, 0,
-
-    0, 0,
-
-    0,
-    pkey_tls1_prf_derive,
-    pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl,
-    pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str
-};
-
-static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
-                           const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
-                           const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
-                           unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
-{
-    int chunk;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
-    EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
-    unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    size_t A1_len;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
-    OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
-    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-    if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-    mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
-    if (mac_key == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
-        goto err;
-    if (seed != NULL && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
-        goto err;
-
-    for (;;) {
-        /* Reinit mac contexts */
-        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
-            goto err;
-        if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len))
-            goto err;
-        if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
-            goto err;
-
-        if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
-            size_t mac_len;
-            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len))
-                goto err;
-            out += mac_len;
-            olen -= mac_len;
-            /* calc the next A1 value */
-            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
-                goto err;
-        } else {                /* last one */
-
-            if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
-                goto err;
-            memcpy(out, A1, olen);
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    ret = 1;
- err:
-    EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
-                        const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
-                        const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
-                        unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
-{
-
-    if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
-        size_t i;
-        unsigned char *tmp;
-        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
-                         seed, seed_len, out, olen))
-            return 0;
-
-        tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-        if (tmp == NULL)
-            return 0;
-        if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
-                         seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
-            OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
-            out[i] ^= tmp[i];
-        OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
-        return 1;
-    }
-    if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
-        return 0;
-
-    return 1;
-}